For each layer of information security there is a number of techniques and tools that can be used to ensure information superiority. Indeed some experts would argue that you cannot have the former without the latter. In today's technological & interconnected world, however, information superiority is very hard to achieve and almost impossible to maintain. This paper will argue that the art of deception is a reliable and cost effective technique that can assure the security of an infrastructure. The paper will conclude by presenting a technical solution of the above statement.
IntroductIon
This paper will attempt to associate the concepts of information superiority and information security while further developing the argument presented by Cohen (1998) by saying that deception should be the main technique to use for assuring the main goals of security.
Information security (InfoSec) as a concept is a utopia. According to Gollmann (1999) , InfoSec is concerned with the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of assets (for definitions see Pfleeger, 1997) . Based on Kabay (1996) , Carroll (1996) , Kove, Seger et al. (1995) , Neumann (1995) , , Summers, 1977) , and Casey (2000) , the following asset categories have been identified: Software, Communications, Data, Hardware, Physical & Environmental, Personnel, and Administrative & Organizational. InfoSec has been defined by Waltz (1998) as: "…the activities to protect hardware, software and intangible information at the hardware and software levels." Figure 1 , based on a figure in (Carroll, 1996) , illustrates the different layers of InfoSec.
There is much debate about InfoSec, and indeed there is much contradiction in the field (Anderson, 2003) . However, are sure neither about their words (blame the ever-changing technology) nor about the proposed solutions (blame the risk that is involved in the process). Surprisingly, though, companies are still spending money for having not to spend money, and to justify that expenditure they pay even more. (see Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2003; ,Briney, 2003) This is not right, especially when we take into consideration the facts of security being a continuous process (Carroll, 1996; Wright, 1999; Smith, 1993; Barber, 2001) and of security being a responsibility of all the stakeholders (defined in Blyth and Kovacich, 2001) no matter their importance and/or strength (Wood, 1997) .
Over the years, academia and the industry have approached the concept of information security in a number of ways (Eloff and Solms, 2000; Computer_ Fraud_Security, 2002; Forte, 2000; Kabay, 1996; Solms, 2001; Jones, 2002; Finne, 1998; Vidalis, Pilgermann et al., 2006) . According to the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey for 2005, the financial loss due to cybercrime has been decreasing since 2002. The question we have to ask (being good hackers…) is why do we observe this drop? Is it because 'Threat Agents' (Vidalis, 2006) have moved on and changed their targets, effectively misleading the InfoSec professionals as to what they should be looking for? Or is it because threat agents now recognize they can achieve more by not attacking the availability of information assets, effectively deceiving the InfoSec officers and the rest of the world?
The above questions initiated the research presented in this paper, and the idea of the virtual honeypots, a technology that makes use of the art of deception to ensure information security in a computing infrastructure. This technology aims to move the "point of reference" in the field of information assurance from risk assessment (Tregear, 2001; Bayne, 2002; Baskerville, 2003) to threat assessment (Jones, 2002; Vidalis, 2001) .
Deception is better realized under the context of information warfare (IW) and information operations (IO). According to (Waltz, 1998) , the two concepts have been defined as: "IO are the continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations." "IW includes actions taken to preserve the integrity of one's own information system from exploitation, corruption, or disruption, while at the same time exploiting, corrupting or destroying an adversary's information system and the process achieving an information advantage in the application force." Naturally, IW and IO have gone through a number of evolution changes. Homer's Iliad saga (Homer, Kirk et al., 2004) is an "early" example and the deception around the various psychological operations involved in the "war against terror." The main reason for these changes is information and the way it is handled and transmitted over the various mediums.
the role of InformAtIon
What is information? Most people use the word without really knowing what it means. When the author was asked to define "information," he replied using the word "knowledge." Indeed, information can be knowledge, but cannot be defined as that. For defining information we go back to 1995 when Menou (1995) wrote "…information encapsulates a wide range of concepts and phenomena.… They relate to both processes and material states which are closely inter-related…" According to the same author, information can be:
A product, which encompasses information as thing, as object, as resource, as commodity, what is carried in a channel, including the channel itself, and the contents.
Based on Waltz (1998) , information has three abstractions: data, information, and knowledge. Data ⦁ ⦁ ⦁ fIGure 1 Information Security Layers (source (Carroll, 1996)) can be individual observations and low-level primitive messages. Threat agents make use of various techniques and technologies (see Hoath and Mulhall, 1998; Barber, 2001; Scambray et al., 2001) to collect data. The next step is to sort, classify or index them into organized sets. These sets are referred to as information. An information gathering methodology that is popular among the "softer" threat agents is presented by Scambray et al. (2001) . The goal is to put the data elements in relational context for further analysis, which will result in understanding the information. Quoting Waltz (1998) : "Understanding of information provides a degree of comprehension of both the static and dynamic relationships of the objects of data and the ability to model structure and past (and future) behaviour of those objects. Knowledge includes both static content and dynamic processes."
Once a threat agent has acquired this knowledge, he or she is able to launch an active attack with a high level of impact (see Kalakota and Whinston, 1997; Daughtrey, 2001; Johnson and Scholes, 1999) . Knowledge is the main factor that distinguishes internal from external threat agents. Internal threat agents, otherwise known as insiders, have been defined by Vidalis (2006) as:
"An insider to an organization is a threat agent who is directly or indirectly employed by that organization, and has access to the system or sensitive information not otherwise disclosed to him and to the general public." An insider prediction tool was presented by Maglaras and Furnell (2002) : "…49% of the respondents faced IT security incidents due to the actions of legitimate users." Statistics on insiders in the United Kingdom can be seen in the UK's National High-Tech Crime Unit survey (NHTCU 2004) and in the United States on the FBI survey (Richardson, 2003) .
Once a threat agent acquires the status of the insider, he or she can understand the "whys" and the "hows" of the system, which will result in acquiring superiority over the defenders of that system. Information superiority is the aim of IO and has been defined in Waltz (1998) as:
"Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." Just having the right information is not going to grant information superiority. In our modern interconnected world the issue of time has great importance. Today, IO officers say that having the right information at the right time can possibly grant information superiority. Under the same context, providing the adversary with the right information in the wrong time, or with the wrong information in the right time, effectively undermining his decision-making processes, can possibly grant information superiority. Fred Cohen (1998) has analyzed extensively the role of deception in information protection.
the role of deceptIon
Deception has been defined in the concise Oxford dictionary (Sykes, 1981) as: "misrepresentation, persuade of what is false, mislead purposely." Deception is an ancient art, and indeed is an art, as noted in many sources, including Campen and Dearth (1998) . Deception dates to the 10 th century BC when King Solomon said: "A wise man has great power, and a man of knowledge increases strength; for waging war you need guidance, and for victory many advisers." The more information one has the better he will be able to assess a situation to take advantage of certain variables for achieving information superiority. When one talks about IO and deception, he or she cannot but quote the famous Chinese general Sun Tzu from the 6 th century BC:
"In respect of military method, we have, firstly, measurement; secondly, estimation of quantity; thirdly, calculation; fourthly, balancing of chances; fifthly, victory.
"Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
"All warfare is based on deception [of the enemy]." NETWAR has been defined by (Waltz, 1998) as: "The information-related conflict waged against nation states or societies at the highest level, with the objective of disrupting, damaging, or modifying what the target population knows about itself or the world around it."
Agreeing to Zhou (Zhou et al., 2004) : "deception in human communication occurs when information senders attempt to create a false impression in receivers." Through deception we can manage our adversary's perception and disrupt his decision-making processes. These processes feed into his (the adversary's) defensive InfoSec processes, which when disrupted will allow the success of our offensive NETOPS (Waltz, 1998 ) that will ensure out information superiority. Knowledge in military terms is intelligence. We have already defined knowledge and how it relates to deception. If we are able to disrupt the intelligence and counterintelligence operations of our adversary, then we can achieve information superiority. The common operation is deception and, agreeing with Cohen (1998) , it is believed to be the future of IO and information security.
Deception allows subduing the enemy without fighting. Fighting cost resources and resources cost money, which is a scarce resource. Security, though, should not be an expensive commodity. The weakest link of a game should be able to afford the same level of security as the strongest link. It is accepted (Vidalis, 2004 ) that the weakest link does not get thrown out of the game but rather destroys the game altogether. Furthermore, fighting is usually a reactive action. It has been proven (Vidalis, 2004 ) that reacting is expensive in security; instead, we want to be proactive and somehow prevent attacks from happening or minimising/nullifying the impact of the threats.
The purpose of deception is to surprise the adversary, which result in either the defenders having time to react and deploy the necessary countermeasures (or finely tune the existing ones), or the threat agent calling off the attack and returning to the information gathering process in order to re-examine his or her plan of action.
Agreeing with Mitnick and Simon (2002) , technology has allowed for an increased capability for information gathering, but perceptions and the nature of decision-making have one common vulnerability: the human factor. Humans sit behind monitors, type, and/ or communicate commands. Humans are in charge of automated procedures and can shut them down if they perceive that something is wrong and that the computer reactions do not make sense. Of course, there are examples of computers being in charge, one being the flooding system in the port of Amsterdam, but the author is yet to meet a general who does not like to have control of everything, or more of the point, who hasn't got control of everything. That applies to network administrators as well. The author has yet to meet a professional network administrator who does not like to have complete control over his system, which constitutes a major vulnerability.
The responsibilities of the network administrator is summarised in the following list: (Waltz, 1998) .
hackers and to alert network administrators of a possible intrusion.
Another definition comes from Provos (2004):
A honeypot is a closely monitored computing resource that we intend to be probed, attacked, or compromised.
By combining the two definitions, we can identify a paradox. We try to improve security by introducing a vulnerability to our infrastructure. Furthermore, in the case of a highly capable threat agent compromising the honeypot and launching a successful active attack, the company owning the honeypot would have to face a series of legal implications. The drawback list of the real honeypot includes its static nature and its inability to dynamically address change. If we add to the list the need of a close and strict management and the resources needed to setup and maintain the honeypot, we can start understanding why the technology never reached its expected success.
The virtual honeypot (VH) technology is designed to address the above drawbacks by interoperating with G4DS (Vidalis, Pilgermann et al., 2006) . It takes the concept of honeyd (Provos, 2004) and exploits it further by truly applying to technology the art of deception. Figure 2 presents an infrastructure making use of the technology.
The VH technology makes use of host machines called "agents." The agents are real machines, part of the primary infrastructure that runs all the virtual machines called virtual honeypots. The agents never respond to network probes with their real credentials. The primary infrastructure does not even know their existence. Instead, each agent runs in promiscuous mode, having a list of virtual MACs, IP, and TCP addresses. If the agent traps a packet intended for a virtual NIC for which it is responsible, it replies with the necessary virtual data. Agents cannot operate across switching devices, which means that an agent can only alter the subnet of which it is a member.
To address issues of integrity and confidentiality of communications, all agents are connected to a central management machine called the VH server, via dedicated lines which we will call secondary infrastructure. The use of the secondary infrastructure allows the management of the agents without By designing a logical network, the administrator makes the life of the threat agents easier, as they can follow the same logic and enumerate the infrastructure. Deception can be used to hide the real computers amongst the false (see later section). By having easily upgradeable computers, the administrator possibly introduces a critical threat against his infrastructure. Should the upgrade procedures get compromised then threat agents will be able to launch catastrophic active attacks. Again, deception can be used to masquerade the procedures and/or produce confusion about what is real. Some would argue that you can never have enough security, a statement that has been posed from threat and risk assessment professionals. Agreeing with Mitnick and Simon (2002) , the network administrator will always have to fear the users of his system. System users are probably the bigger vulnerability of that system as they are susceptible to social engineering attacks. If we consider that deceiving our own users is acceptable then deception can offer a solution to the social engineering vulnerability. User deception and the ethical issues involved are examined in another paper developed by the author. To summarise, deception can be used in two ways for ensuring security in a computing infrastructure:
Simulating: showing the false, drawing attention away from the real Dissimulating: hiding the real, producing confusion about what is real Deception must employ people from unconventional backgrounds, people who understand the world. It is a psychological, not a technological, exercise. The following section presents a technology that makes use of psychological profiles in order to affect the decision-making process of the threat agents, effectively deceiving them about the nature and layout of the infrastructure.
VIrtuAl honeypots -An oVerVIew
According to Sadasivam et al. (2005) :
Honeypots are closely monitored decoys that are employed in a network to study the trail of ⦁ ⦁ revealing the operations to the rest of the world. Indeed, the only persons, in any given time, that know the real layout of the infrastructure should be the two information security officers who monitor the VH servers' dual monitors. Furthermore, threat agents are not able to identify the agents and the server by monitoring the traffic in the primary infrastructure, and the primary infrastructure is not getting encumbered with the management traffic. The VH server is part of both infrastructures, and by combining data collected from both it constructs the infrastructure that is presented to the rest of the world. The server does not offer any service through its primary NIC. Periodically it interrogates the primary infrastructure to update the layout. Similar to the agents, the server never replies to any probes with its real credentials. The difference is that while an agent could reply with a set of virtual credentials, the server has none. A threat agent could potentially identify this black hole in the network and use it to identify the server; hence, considerations are being made for masquerading the server as another server (potentially a printer server).
The front-end application runs on top of the management engine in the server and is similar to the Windows Explorer application. With the use of the mouse and keyboard, the user is able to dynamically add or delete virtual machines in the same way that he uses Explorer to add and delete files and folders. The user then has a choice of selecting the type of hardware and software for the virtual machine, the type of the virtual NIC, and an associated directory tree.
ethIcAl dIscussIon
The presented technology and the philosophy behind it raise some ethical concerns, as computers are becoming more and more a part of who and what we are as human beings. Humans use computer infrastructures to conduct business. These infrastructures hold personal data that can be used to alter the lives of human beings. Do have examples of humans who are using computer infrastructures to control other humans? What we are suggesting in this paper is not any different. We propose a system that will somehow affect the judgment of threat agents. Threat agents by definition (see Vidalis, 2006) are the "bad guys," and late examples taken form the news indicate that anything is allowed when protecting our freedoms. But how ethical is that? To answer the above question, we need to examine the nature of ethics. What is ethical and what is not? Who makes the distinction? What are the factors that determine the nature of ethics? What is ethics indeed?
A classic definition of computer ethics came from Moor (1985) :
"The analysis of the nature and social impact of computer technology and the corresponding formulation and justification of policies for the ethical use of such technology."
Based on this definition, computer ethics are concerned with the social impact of the technology, which leads to the question: "What is social and what is society?," the answer of which is above the scope of this paper. In a simplistic form, though, society is a group of people, their beliefs, and their actions (and reactions). With the introduction of the Internet to our everyday lives, and with the globalization phenomenon, societies are not all that different anymore, so we can safely say that humanity has a lot of common basic ethics, and any differences will continue to diminish. People do want to feel safe and in control. Anything that will threaten their freedoms without giving them a chance to react will be considered unethical. To preserve those freedoms, sometimes drastic measures will have to be taken. These measures depend on the nature of the threat agent and on the target vulnerability. For example, using any means to protect a water reserve form biological weapons is accepted. On the other hand, a government can do only so much against a 14-year old who is playing with his laptop testing the "outer defences" of the .mil infrastructure.
Based on the above definition, the impact of the presented technology will have an effect on the associated ethical issues. The technology itself is neutral. A good example is firearms: Firearms do not kill people, people kill people. The abuse of firearms is considered unethical. The abuse of the VH will be unethical. Some will say that such a technology could act as a catalyst for people performing unethical actions in the cyber world. My answer is that threat agents already perform such actions. The VH technology, as long as it is used for defensive purposes, will only give a better chance of preserving our cyber freedoms.
conclusIon
The aim of Virtual Honeypots is the near realtime threat agent deception, so the ten principles of strategic deception (Campen and Dearth, 1998) were also considered to be the objectives of the technology:
1. All of the infrastructure should be dedicated to the execution of the deception. 2. Intelligence will be brought fully to the picture via interoperating with G4DS (Vidalis., 2006) . 3. Intelligence will be cross-checked and combined in G4DS . 4. Secrecy will be enforced via the use of anonymity, confidentiality, and authentication procedures of G4DS (Vidalis, 2006) and by the design of the VH technology. 5. The deception plan will be designed at the top levels of the enterprise. 6. Full implementation and consistency of all elements of deception via the use of a central management plan throughout the supply chain of the enterprises involved in the plan. 7. Virtual honeypots will introduce no hindrances to existing security policies and counter measures. 8. Deception via the VH technology will be a continuous process. 9. The aim of VH is long term; individual shortterm security aims are fulfilled by other counter measures. 10. The technology will stimulate the threat agent imagination as virtual honeypots can differentiate between each threat agent category.
The nature of deception was examined in previous sections. It requires the cooperation of all the involved actors, be they human, hardware, or software. To be successful, the technology will have to be used against the users of the infrastructure that it is deployed. We cannot let company employees acquire knowledge or information that will jeopardize the deception plan of that company. This action will minimize the effects of any social engineering attacks and help identify internal threat agents. Because virtual honeypots will be offering no real services, any attempt to contact one will be suspicious and declare an act of an information gathering process.
VHs are designed to inter-operate with G4DS (Vidalis, 2006) . G4DS is a new generation IDS system that makes use of the GRID technology and brings together organizations by forming virtual communities. The system allows the identification and monitoring of threat agents and their actions while attacking the infrastructure protected by G4DS. The threat knowledge gathered by G4DS can be used as intelligence in the VH system. The intelligence can be considered secure and accurate without any need for further analysis, as G4DS has ensured its integrity and confidentiality.
The system is still in an early stage of development (started in 2006) . It has been presented in the European Conference of Information warfare and Security in July 2005 in Glamorgan, United Kingdom, and it is believed that a complete system will potentially have a great impact in the field of information security.
